Partly Free Semantics for Some Anderson-Like Ontological Proofs

Anderson-like ontological proofs, studied in this paper, employ contingent identity, free principles of quantification of the 1st order variables and classical principles of quantification of the 2nd order variables. All these theories are strongly complete wrt. classes of modal structures containing families of world-varying objectual domains of the 1st order and constant conceptual domains of the 2nd order. In such structures, terms of the 1st order receive only rigid extensions, which are elements of the union of all 1st order domains. Terms of the 2nd order receive extensions and intensions. Given a family of preselected world-varying objectual domains of the 2nd order, non-rigid extensions of the 2nd order terms belong always to a preselected domain connected with a given world. Rigid intensions of the 2nd order terms are chosen from among members of a conceptual domain of the 2nd order, which is the set of all functions from the set of worlds to the union of all 2nd order preselected domains such that values of these functions at a given world belong to a preselected domain connected with this world
Keywords Ontological proof  God  Essence  Necessary existence  Positive properties  Absolute and relative identity  Strong completeness
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DOI 10.1007/s10849-011-9146-9
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First-Order Modal Logic.Melvin Fitting, R. Mendelsohn & Roderic A. Girle - 2002 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):429-430.
Relative Identity.Nicholas Griffin - 1977 - Clarendon Press.
Free Logic: Selected Essays.Karel Lambert - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.

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