Inquiry 17 (1):464-473 (1974)
In this note I argue that although Rorty's programme (Inquiry, Vol. 15, No. 4) to bring into focus the role that belief plays in self?deception is a salutary one, her actual claims obscure that role. It is also contended that Rorty fails to de?mythologize self?deception, since her account is either paradox?ridden or else describes a concept recognizably distinct from the concept of self?deception
|Keywords||Belief Morality Philosophical Anthropology Self-deception Rorty, A|
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An Agentive Non-Intentionalist Theory of Self-Deception.Kevin Lynch - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-20.
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