Abstract

Children's understanding of the intentionality of people, animals, plants, and objects was explored. Historical and current intentionality research was critiqued, including theory-of-mind and animism . ;Investigators have viewed children's intentionality as based on cognitive constructions, social shaping, or primitive confusion. Instead, children may have a fundamentally intentional viewpoint. Children extend their own intentionality to events, objects, and animals when such assignment is plausible and meaningful. Previous researchers have underestimated/discounted children's intentional assignments, using biased measurement or problematic models. This study sought to illuminate problematic methodology by separating questions of biology from intentionality, controlling for plausibility, and using both direct assignment and story measures. ;Three experimental measures were given to 216 children . Children were asked to assign intentional and biological properties to a range of entities. Children were also asked to judge plausibility and preference for intentional descriptions. Finally, children were given stories with positive or negative outcomes. Children then assigned agency, intention of consequence, and desire to receive the event for human, animal, plant, and object story characters. ;Younger children were found to assign greater intentionality to inanimate objects and plants than older children. All children assigned intentionality to themselves and humans, and older children assigned greater intentionality to animals. All children preferred intentional descriptions and did not systematically judge them as implausible. Finally, younger children assigned intentionality to story characters with positive outcomes, and lower levels of intentionality with negative outcomes. ;Older children appeared to base intentionality assignments on an animal/non-animal distinction. Younger children appeared to base intentionality assignments on probability and desirability . Implications are: first, researchers must not confound biology with intentionality; second, younger children are strongly influenced by story outcome in assigning intentionality and cognitive abilities. Thus, theory-of-mind methodology may be studying children's assignment of desirable outcomes to themselves or others instead of studying children's intentionality or belief. Finally, children's intentional assignments and explanations can be viewed as a fundamental and legitimate way of understanding the world.