Epistemiczna koncepcja prawdy a relatywizm

Filozofia Nauki 3 (2003)

Authors
Tadeusz Szubka
Uniwersytet Szczeciński
Abstract
Epistemic conceptions of truth, for which truth is defined in terms of justifiability or assertibility in properly idealized conditions, are very often considered as unavoidably linked with relativism. The paper argues that such a link is not unavoidable. The reason is that there are accounts of justification that do not have relativistic consequences, and therefore one may propose an epistemic conception of truth that does not have those consequences either
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