Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 26 (3):515-543 (2006)

Victor Tadros
University of Warwick
This article is a defence of a differentiated offence of rape. A differentiated offence is an offence which can be completed in a number of different ways that cannot be captured in a simple definition. It is argued that such an offence would meet several concerns that have been expressed in the feminist literature about the law of rape. It would assist certainty, it would reduce the extent to which the offence focuses on the conduct of the complainant, it would allow the law to express that violence is central to the offence of rape where violence is present, but it would also allow convictions of rape where there is no violence. The argument is developed through critical engagement with the law of rape as set out in the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The Sexual Offences Act, it is argued, fails adequately to meet the concerns outlined above
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DOI 10.1093/ojls/gql016
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Rethinking the Presumption of Innocence.Victor Tadros - 2006 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 1 (2):193-213.
Rethinking the Wrong of Rape1.Karyn L. Freedman - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):104-127.

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