Boundaries in Reality

Ratio 25 (4):405-424 (2012)
Abstract
This paper defends the idea that there must be some joints in reality, some correct way to classify or categorize it. This may seem obvious, but we will see that there are at least three conventionalist arguments against this idea, as well as philosophers who have found them convincing. The thrust of these arguments is that the manner in which we structure, divide or carve up the world is not grounded in any natural, genuine boundaries in the world. Ultimately they are supposed to pose a serious threat to realism. The first argument that will be examined concerns the claim that there are no natural boundaries in reality, the second one focuses on the basis of our classificatory schemes, which the conventionalist claims to be merely psychological, and the third considers the significance of our particular features in carving up the world, such as physical size and perceptual capabilities. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that none of these objections succeed in undermining the existence of genuine joints in reality.
Keywords realism  conventionalism  joint-carving  natural kinds
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2012.00554.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Truth‐Grounding and Transitivity.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):332-340.
The Modal Status of Laws: In Defence of a Hybrid View.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):509-528.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
What If Reality has No Architecture?Bence Nanay - 2011 - The Monist 94 (181):197.
Hirsch's Attack on Ontologese.Theodore Sider - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):565-572.
Merleau-Ponty, Metaphysical Realism and the Natural World.Simon P. James - 2007 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (4):501 – 519.
Natural Kinds and Biological Realisms.Michael Devitt - 2011 - In Michael O'Rourke, Joseph Keim Campbell & Matthew H. Slater (eds.), Carving Nature at its Joints. MIT Press.
La durata naturale di un genere naturale.Andrea Borghini - 2008 - Rivista di Estetica 48 (39):89-101.
Half-Naturalized Social Kinds.Richard W. Miller - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):652.
"Realism and the Problem of" Infimae Species".Crawford Elder - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):111 - 127.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-02-25

Total downloads

338 ( #8,297 of 2,163,866 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

18 ( #18,743 of 2,163,866 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums