Consciousness and Cognition 21 (4):1725-1738 (2012)

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Abstract
How do we acquire a mental representation of our own face? Recently, synchronous, but not asynchronous, interpersonal multisensory stimulation between one’s own and another person’s face has been used to evoke changes in self-identification. We investigated the conscious experience of these changes with principal component analyses that revealed that while the conscious experience during synchronous IMS focused on resemblance and similarity with the other’s face, during asynchronous IMS it focused on multisensory stimulation. Analyses of the identified common factor structure revealed significant quantitative differences between synchronous and asynchronous IMS on self-identification and perceived similarity with the other’s face. Experiment 2 revealed that participants with lower interoceptive sensitivity experienced stronger enfacement illusion. Overall, self-identification and body-ownership rely on similar basic mechanisms of multisensory integration, but the effects of multisensory input on their experience are qualitatively different, possibly underlying the face’s unique role as a marker of selfhood.
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DOI 10.1016/j.concog.2012.10.004
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References found in this work BETA

Chimpanzees: Self-Recognition.G. G. Gallup - 1970 - Science 167:86-87.
The Neural Correlates of Visual Self-Recognition.Christel Devue & Serge Brédart - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (1):40-51.
Faces and Ascriptions: Mapping Measures of the Self.Dan Zahavi & Andreas Roepstorff - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (1):141-148.

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Interoceptive Inference, Emotion, and the Embodied Self.Anil K. Seth - 2013 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (11):565-573.

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