A Defence of Lucretian Presentism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):675-690 (2020)
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Abstract

In this paper, we defend Lucretian Presentism. Although the view faces many objections and has proven unpopular with presentists, we rehabilitate Lucretianism and argue that none of the objections stick.

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Author Profiles

David Ingram
University of York
Jonathan Tallant
Nottingham University

Citations of this work

Presentism’s persisting problem.Lisa Leininger - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Four Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.
Truth and Ontology.Trenton Merricks - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
How to have a radically minimal ontology.Ross P. Cameron - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (2):249 - 264.

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