Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):538-564 (2016)
AbstractThe author identifies the structure of Sharon Street's skeptical challenge to non-naturalist, normative epistemic realism as an argument that NNER is liable to reliability defeat and then argues that Street's argument fails, because it itself is subject to reliability defeat. As the author reconstructs Street's argument, it is an argument that the normative epistemic judgments of the realist could only be probabilistically sensitive to normative epistemic truths by sheer chance. The author then recaps Street's own naturalist translation of normative epistemic judgments into purely descriptive, contingent probability statements, and argues that, on her own terms, the reasoning that leads her to rationally believe in evolutionary theory could only be probabilistically sensitive to the relevant purely descriptive, contingent probabilities by sheer chance. The author's argument is addressed to Street, but it applies to all evolutionary naturalist accounts of epistemic rationality. The author explains how his argument differs from Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism and shows how it avoids the objections to Plantinga's EAAN. The author closes with the outline of an explanation of how evolution could have made human reasoning probabilistically sensitive to metaphysically necessary normative epistemic standards, even though those standards did not exert and, indeed, could not have exerted any kind of causal influence on the evolutionary process.
Similar books and articles
Response to Stephen Law on the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism.Calum Miller - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):147-152.
Naturalism and Darwin's Doubt: A Study of Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism.Omar Aziz Mirza - 2003 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
Debunking Morality: Lessons from the EAAN Literature.Andrew Moon - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):208-226.
An epistemic defeater for Islamic belief?Erik Baldwin & Tyler McNabb - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 76 (4):352-367.
The troublesome explanandum in Plantinga’s argument against naturalism.Yingjin Xu - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (1):1-15.
A user’s guide to the evolutionary argument against naturalism.Omar Mirza - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (2):125 - 146.
How to save naturalism from Plantinga?Daniel D. Novotný - 2007 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 14 (1):32-48.
Semantic Inferentialism and the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism.James Collin - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (9):846-856.
Evolutionary Naturalism and the Reliability of Our Cognitive Faculties.David Silver - 2003 - Faith and Philosophy 20 (1):50-62.
The Moral Theory of Evolutionary Naturalism.William Fletcher Quillian - 1945 - Oxford University PRess.
A House Divided Against Itself Cannot Stand: Plantinga on the Self-Defeat of Evolutionary Naturalism.Timothy O'Connor - 2001 - In James Beilby (ed.), Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. Cornell.
Plantinga's Innocent Assumption: Self-Defeating Naturalism, and Churchland's Response.Matt DeStefano - 2006 - Res Cogitans 3 (1):26-33.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
An Evolutionary Sceptical Challenge to Scientific Realism.Christophe de Ray - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):969-989.
Is epistemic circularity a fallacy?William J. Talbott - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2277-2298.
Review of The Social Psychology of Morality. [REVIEW]Michael Klenk - 2016 - Metapsychology Online 20 (48):1-8.
References found in this work
The meaning of 'meaning'.Hillary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.