Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):516-535 (2008)
Abstract: Many philosophers believe that people who are not capable of grasping the significance of moral considerations are not open to moral blame when they fail to respond appropriately to these considerations. I contend, however, that some morally blind, or 'psychopathic,' agents are proper targets for moral blame, at least on some occasions. I argue that moral blame is a response to the normative commitments and attitudes of a wrongdoer and that the actions of morally blind agents can express the relevant blame-grounding attitudes insofar as these agents possess the capacity to make judgments about non-moral reasons.
|Keywords||Psychopathy Blame Normative Competence Moral Responsibility|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Moral Competence, Moral Blame, and Protest.Matthew Talbert - 2012 - Journal of Ethics 16 (1):89-109.
Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral Responsibility.David Shoemaker - 2011 - Ethics 121 (3):602-632.
Psychopathy, Responsibility, and the Moral/Conventional Distinction.David W. Shoemaker - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):99-124.
Similar books and articles
The Force and Fairness of Blame.Pamela Hieronymi - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):115–148.
The Relativism of Blame and Williams's Relativism of Distance.Miranda Fricker - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):151-177.
Implanted Desires, Self-Formation and Blame.Matthew Talbert - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 (2):1-18.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads144 ( #32,247 of 2,158,407 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #87,143 of 2,158,407 )
How can I increase my downloads?