Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):127-127 (1997)
I agree with Mele that self-deception is not intentional deception; but I do believe that self-deception involves intentional biasing, primarily for two reasons: (1) There is a Bayesian model of self-deception that explains why the biasing is rational. (2) It is implausible that the observed behavior of self- deceivers could be generated by Mele's “blind” mechanisms.
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Self-Deception: A Teleofunctional Approach.David Livingstone Smith - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):181-199.
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