Erkenntnis 71 (3):407-416 (2009)
Here, I defend the view that there is no sensible way to pin a truth-maker objection on presentism. First, I suggest that if we adopt truth-maker maximalism then the presentist can requisition appropriate ontological resources with impunity. Second, if we deny maximalism, then the presentist can sensibly restrict the truth-maker principle in order to avoid the demand for truth-makers for talk about the non-present.
|Keywords||Philosophy Logic Ethics Ontology Epistemology Philosophy|
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References found in this work BETA
Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Theodore Sider - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
The Hard Road to Presentism.Jamin Asay & Sam Baron - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (3):314-335.
Tensed Supervenience: A No‐Go for Presentism.Sam Baron - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):383-401.
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The Grounding Problem and Presentist Explanations.Torrengo Giuliano - forthcoming - Synthese.
Presentism and the Objection From Being-Supervenience.Brian Kierland & Bradley Monton - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):485-497.
Existence, Proof and Truth-Making: A Perspective on the Intuitionistic Conception of Truth.Göran Sundholm - 1994 - Topoi 13 (2):117-126.
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