Erkenntnis 71 (3):407-416 (2009)
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| Abstract |
Here, I defend the view that there is no sensible way to pin a truth-maker objection on presentism. First, I suggest that if we adopt truth-maker maximalism then the presentist can requisition appropriate ontological resources with impunity. Second, if we deny maximalism, then the presentist can sensibly restrict the truth-maker principle in order to avoid the demand for truth-makers for talk about the non-present.
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| Keywords | Philosophy Logic Ethics Ontology Epistemology Philosophy |
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| DOI | 10.1007/s10670-009-9188-4 |
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References found in this work BETA
Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Theodore Sider - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Presentism, Eternalism, and the Growing Block.Kristie Miller - 2013 - In Heather Dyke & Adrian Bardon (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Time. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 345-364.
View all 27 citations / Add more citations
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Existence, Proof and Truth-Making: A Perspective on the Intuitionistic Conception of Truth.Göran Sundholm - 1994 - Topoi 13 (2):117-126.
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