Philosophy 76 (1):111-125 (2001)
Surprisingly, materialists and dualists often appeal to the same factors in their depiction of being an embodied, human person: sensations, agency, and causal underpinnings. I propose that this picture be expanded to include epistemic, structural, and affective components. I further propose that these elements, taken together, be construed as virtues. Being an embodied, human person consists in the exercise of six types of virtues: Sensory Virtues, the Virtue of Agency, Constitutional Virtues, Epistemic Virtues, Structural Virtues, and Affective Virtues. This project draws on recent contributions to virtue epistemology and to the philosophical analysis of self-respect.
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Responding to N.T. Wright's Rejection of the Soul.Brandon L. Rickabaugh - 2016 - Heythrop Journal 58 (3).
The Epistemically Virtuous Clinician.James A. Marcum - 2009 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 30 (3):249-265.
Consciousness and the Prospects for Substance Dualism.John Spackman - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1054-1065.
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