Logique Et Analyse 183:447-478 (2003)

Allard Tamminga
University of Greifswald
The branch of philosophical logic which has become known as “belief change” has, in the course of its development, become alienated from its epistemological origins. However, as formal criteria do not suffice to defend a principled choice between competing systems for belief change, we do need to take their epistemological embedding into account. Here, on the basis of a detailed examination of Isaac Levi's epistemology, we argue for a new direction of belief change research and propose to construct systems for belief change that can do without, but do not rule out, selection functions, in order to enable an *empirical* assessment of the relative merits of competing belief change systems.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Partition and Revision: The Semantics of Counterfactuals.Angelika Kratzer - 1981 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (2):201 - 216.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
169 ( #69,453 of 2,507,636 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #81,082 of 2,507,636 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes