Dissertation, University of Amsterdam (2001)

Authors
Allard Tamminga
University of Greifswald
Abstract
C.S. Peirce's and Isaac Levi's accounts of the belief-doubt-belief model are discussed and evaluated. It is argued that the contemporary study of belief change has metamorphosed into a branch of philosophical logic where empirical considerations have become obsolete. A case is made for reformulations of belief change systems that do allow for empirical tests. Last, a belief change system is presented that (1) uses finite representations of information, (2) can adequately deal with inconsistencies, (3) has finite operations of change, (4) can do without extra-logical elements, and (5) only licenses consistent beliefs.
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References found in this work BETA

Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Realism with a Human Face.Hilary Putnam - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
General Propositions and Causality.Frank Plumpton Ramsey - 1929 - In The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner. pp. 237-255.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Four-Valued Dynamic Epistemic Logic.Yuri David Santos - 2020 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 29 (4):451-489.

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