Affective polarization, wholeheartedness, and fanaticism

In (2024)
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Abstract

: In this chapter I argue that fanaticism is characterized by an orientation to value. I identify three distinctive features of this way of committing to one’s values. First, it is wholehearted. Second, it involves a perception that the values one has chosen are at risk of being rendered unintelligible. Third, the choice of the values to which the fanatic commits wholeheartedly is based on emotional appraisals or moral testimony rather than on reflection. I also argue that these appraisals are often constituted by group-based emotions. Contra Katsafanas (2019), I show that fanaticism is not necessarily a rational failing or a moral pathology. However, fanaticism often exhibits these shortcomings because it is a product of affective polarization by means of emotional contagion. I support this claim by showing that polarizing processes tend to produce emotions that are not fitting.

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Alessandra Tanesini
Cardiff University

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