Contractarianism and Secondary Direct Moral Standing for Marginal Humans and Animals

Res Publica 19 (2):1-16 (2013)
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Abstract

It is commonly thought that neo-Hobbesian contractarianism cannot yield direct moral standing for marginal humans and animals. However, it has been argued that marginal humans and animals can have a form of direct moral standing under neo-Hobbesian contractarianism: secondary moral standing. I will argue that, even if such standing is direct, this account is unsatisfactory because it is counterintuitive and fragile.

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Julia Tanner
Durham University