In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Vol 5. Oxford University Press (2010)

Julie Tannenbaum
Pomona College
Historically the terms “final,” “unconditional,” and “intrinsic” have played a foundational role in ethical theory. I argue that final/instrumental distinction is best understood in terms of the for-sake-of relation and involves a tri-part division of goods. I show that this first way of categorizing goods is more closely aligned with a second way of categorizing goods in terms of intrinsic/extrinsic goods than has thus far been acknowledged. Lastly, I distinguish yet a third way of categorizing goods: unconditional/conditional goods. While the final/instrumental and intrinsic/extrinsic distinctions have received the lion’s share of philosophical attention, the unconditional/conditional distinction is no less important.
Keywords unconditional  final  intrinsic
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The Relational Value of Empathy.Monika Betzler - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (2):136-161.
Value Taxonomy.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2015 - In Tobias Brosch & David Sander (eds.), Handbook of Value. Oxford: Oxfocd University Press. pp. 23-42.
Philosophising Outside of the Academy.Julie Tannenbaum - 2015 - Journal of Medical Ethics 41 (6):491-492.

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