Reliability Theories of Justified Credence

Mind 125 (497):63-94 (2016)
Abstract
Reliabilists hold that a belief is doxastically justified if and only if it is caused by a reliable process. But since such a process is one that tends to produce a high ratio of true to false beliefs, reliabilism is on the face of it applicable to binary beliefs, but not to degrees of confidence or credences. For while beliefs admit of truth or falsity, the same cannot be said of credences in general. A natural question now arises: Can reliability theories of justified belief be extended or modified to account for justified credence? In this paper, I address this question. I begin by showing that, as it stands, reliabilism cannot account for justified credence. I then consider three ways in which the reliabilist may try to do so by extending or modifying her theory, but I argue that such attempts face certain problems. After that, I turn to a version of reliabilism that incorporates evidentialist elements and argue that it allows us to avoid the problems that the other theories face. If I am right, this gives reliabilists a reason, aside from those given recently by Comesaña and Goldman, to move towards such a kind of hybrid theory
Keywords reliabilism  reliability  justified credence  justified degrees of belief  justification
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/mind/fzv199
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.
Evidentialist Reliabilism.Juan Comesaña - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):571-600.
The Generality Problem for Reliabilism.E. Conee & R. Feldman - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 89 (1):1-29.

View all 31 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Beliefs Do Not Come in Degrees.Andrew Moon - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):760-778.
Reliabilism and the Suspension of Belief.Weng Hong Tang - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):362-377.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
How to Be a Reliabilist.Jonathan Kvanvig - 1986 - American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (2):189 - 198.
Reliabilism.Alvin Goldman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Goldman's Reliability Theory of Justified Belief.Elizabeth Ring - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (4):501 – 507.
Reliability for Degrees of Belief.Jeff Dunn - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1929-1952.
Should Reliabilists Be Worried About Demon Worlds?Jack Lyons - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):1-40.
Reliability and Justified Belief.John L. Pollock - 1984 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):103 - 114.
Hume and Justified Belief.Michael J. Costa - 1981 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):219 - 228.
Three Kinds of Reliabilism.Frank Hofmann - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):59 - 80.
Reliabilism: Holistic or Simple?Jeffrey Dunn - 2012 - Episteme 9 (3):225-233.
A Paradox of Justified Believing.Colin Cheyne - 2009 - Ratio 22 (3):278-290.
Why the Generality Problem is Everybody's Problem.Michael A. Bishop - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (2):285 - 298.
Against Transglobal Reliabilism.Peter J. Graham - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):525-535.
Added to PP index
2014-09-17

Total downloads
238 ( #15,543 of 2,180,556 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
25 ( #8,563 of 2,180,556 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums