The AGM theory and inconsistent belief change

Logique Et Analyse 48 (189-192):113-150 (2005)

Authors
Koji Tanaka
Australian National University
Abstract
The problem of how to accommodate inconsistencies has attracted quite a number of researchers, in particular, in the area of database theory. The problem is also of concern in the study of belief change. For inconsistent beliefs are ubiquitous. However, comparatively little work has been devoted to discussing the problem in the literature of belief change. In this paper, I examine how adequate the AGM theory is as a logical framework for belief change involving inconsistencies. The technique is to apply to Grove’s sphere system, a semantical representation of the AGM theory, logics that do not infer everything from contradictory premises, viz., paraconsistent logics. I use three paraconsistent logics and discuss three sphere systems that are based on them. I then examine the completeness of the postulates of the AGM theory with respect to the systems. At the end, I discuss some philosophical implications of the examination.
Keywords Belief Revision  AGM Theory  Inconsistent Beliefs
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Paraconsistent Dynamics.Patrick Girard & Koji Tanaka - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):1-14.
On AGM for Non-Classical Logics.Renata Wassermann - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):271 - 294.
Formal Models of Coherence and Legal Epistemology.Amalia Amaya - 2007 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 15 (4):429-447.

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