Ambivalent emotions and the perceptual account of emotions

Analysis 65 (287):229-233 (2005)
Abstract
This paper replies to an argument due to Greenspan (1980) and to Morton (2002) against the view that emotions are perceptions of values. The argument holds that this view cannot make room for ambivalent emotions both of which are appropriate, such as when it is appropriate to feel fear and attraction towards something. This would make for a contradiction, for appropriate emotions are supposed to present things as they are. The problem, I argue, is that this line of thoughts forgets that things can have positive and negative aspects: something can both be dangerous and attractive, for instance.
Keywords Emotion  Metaphysics  Perception  Value  Greenspan, Patricia S  Morton, Adam
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8284.2005.00555.x
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References found in this work BETA
The Passions.Robert C. Solomon - 1976 - University of Notre Dame Press.
Action, Emotion And Will.A. J. P. Kenny - 1963 - Ny: Humanities Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Pleasure and Its Contraries.Olivier Massin - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):15-40.
Emotions as Psychological Reactions.Edoardo Zamuner - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (1):22-43.

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