Philosophical Studies 153 (2):299 - 306 (2011)

Authors
Paul P Tappenden
King's College London (PhD)
Abstract
Some analyses of personal fission suggest that an informed subject should expect to have a distinct experience of each outcome simultaneously. Is rational provision for the future possible in such unfamiliar circumstances? I argue that, with some qualification, the subject can reasonably act as if faced with alternative possible outcomes with precise probabilities rather than multiple actual outcomes
Keywords Personal identity  Personal fission  Stage theory  Decision theory  Probability
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Reprint years 2011
DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9494-3
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References found in this work BETA

Four-Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.
Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic.David K. Lewis - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (5):113-126.
All the World’s a Stage.Theodore Sider - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (3):433 – 453.

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Citations of this work BETA

Temporal Parts.Katherine Hawley - 2004/2010 - Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy.
Asymmetric Personal Identity.Theodore Sider - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (2):127-146.
A Metaphysics for Semantic Internalism.Paul Tappenden - 2011 - Metaphysica 12 (2):125-136.
Divided We Fall.Jacob Ross - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):222-262.

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