In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 97--120 (2003)

Authors
Christine Tappolet
Université de Montréal
Abstract
After discussing de Sousa's view of emotion in akrasia, I suggest that emotions be viewed as nonconceptual perceptions of value (see Tappolet 2000). It follows that they can render intelligible actions which are contrary to one's better judgment. An emotion can make one's action intelligible even when that action is opposed by one's all-things-considered judgment. Moreover, an akratic action prompted by an emotion may be more rational than following one's better judgement, for it may be the judgement and not the perception which is in error. By contrast, "cool" akrasia is genuinely puzzling; it is not clear whether it exists.
Keywords Akrasia  Emotion  Value  Davidson, D
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DOI 10.1093/0199257361.003.0005
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Extended Emotion.J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & S. Orestis Palermos - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):198-217.
Habitual Weakness.Kenneth Silver - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (4):270-277.
Comment: Every Action Is an Emotional Action.Bence Nanay - 2017 - Emotion Review 9 (4):350-352.

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