In Meghan Griffith, Kevin Timpe & Neil Levy (eds.), Routledge Companion to Free Will. Routledge (forthcoming)

Authors
Christine Tappolet
Université de Montréal
Abstract
Akratic actions are often being thought to instantiate a paradigmatic self-control failure. . If we suppose that akrasia is opposed to self-control, the question is how akratic actions could be free and intentional. After all, it would seem that it is only if an action manifests self-control that it can count as free. My plan is to explore the relation between akrasia and self-control. The first section presents what I shall call the standard conception, according to which akrasia and self-control are contraries, and introduces the puzzle that this conception raises. The second section turns to the arguments for and against the possibility of free and intentional akratic actions. The third section questions the claim that akratic actions are necessarily opposed to actions manifesting self-control.
Keywords Self-control  Akrasia  Weakness of will  Free agency  Intentional action  Reason-responsiveness
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
The Moral Problem.Michael Smith (ed.) - 1994 - Wiley.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.

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