What is Value? Where Does it Come From? A Philosophical Perspective

In Tobias Brosch & David Sander (eds.), The Value Handbook: The Affective Sciences of Values and Valuation. pp. 3-22 (2015)
Authors
Christine Tappolet
Université de Montréal
Mauro Rossi
Université du Québec à Montréal
Abstract
Are values objective or subjective? To clarify this question we start with an overview of the main concepts and debates in the philosophy of values. We then discuss the arguments for and against value realism, the thesis that there are objective evaluative facts. By contrast with value anti-realism, which is generally associated with sentimentalism, according to which evaluative judgements are grounded in sentiments, value realism is commonly coupled with rationalism. Against this common view, we argue that value realism can be combined with sentimentalism, and we suggest that a plausible account, which we call ‘sentimental realism’, and according to which evaluative judgements are closely related to emotions, can be developped.
Keywords anti-realism  cognitivism  constructivism  emotion  motivation  objectivity  rationalism  realism  sentimentalism  subjectiviy
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