Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):599-623 (2019)

Authors
Christian Tarsney
Oxford University
Abstract
Even if I think it very likely that some morally good act is supererogatory rather than obligatory, I may nonetheless be rationally required to perform that act. This claim follows from an apparently straightforward dominance argument, which parallels Jacob Ross's argument for 'rejecting' moral nihilism. These arguments face analogous pairs of objections that illustrate general challenges for dominance reasoning under normative uncertainty, but (I argue) these objections can be largely overcome. This has practical consequences for the ethics of philanthropy -- in particular, it means that donors are often rationally required to maximize the positive impact of their donations.
Keywords moral uncertainty  normative uncertainty  supererogation  effective altruism
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DOI 10.1111/papq.12239
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