Yes, we are zombies, but we can become conscious

Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):361-364 (1995)
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Abstract

Moody ends his provocative article on `Conversations with zombies' by raising the possibility that `We might, after all, be zombies'. By zombies he means creatures who appear to act intelligently, like us, but who have no internal experience of consciousness. My basic point in this brief commentary will be to note as a basic observation that we are indeed, as a matter of verifiable fact, like zombies most of the time but we have a possibility of becoming conscious. The consequences of this observable and testable reality are of enormous importance for the development of a fuller understanding of consciousness and its possibilities

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