Acquaintance and possible worlds

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):393-400 (2008)
I argue that if a subject's acquaintance with an object is necessary for him to think about and refer to the object, then the content of his thought cannot be a set of metaphysically possible worlds. Acquaintance resets what possibilities there are; it affects the powers of representation, and does not only limit the range of possibilities. If acquaintance restricts what a subject can think about, the theorist cannot specify what possibilities are open to the subject simply in terms of possible worlds.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2008.00254.x
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Stalnaker (1978). Assertion. Syntax and Semantics (New York Academic Press) 9:315-332.
Robert Stalnaker (1987). Semantics for Belief. Philosophical Topics 15 (1):177-190.

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