Berkeley's theory of abstract ideas

Philosophical Quarterly 28 (111):97-115 (1978)
While claiming to refute locke's theory of abstract ideas, Berkeley himself accepts a form of abstractionism. Locke's account of abstraction is indeterminate between two doctrines: 1) abstract ideas are representations of paradigm instances of kinds, 2) abstract ideas are schematic representations of the defining features of kinds. Berkeley's arguments are directed exclusively against 2, And refute only a specific version of it, Which there is no reason to ascribe to locke; berkeley himself accepts abstract ideas of the former type. Locke's theory suffers from circularity and redundancy, Berkeley's from conflation of thought with imagination
Keywords Berkeley, George
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DOI 10.2307/2219357
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Berkeley et les idées générales mathématiques.Claire Schwartz - 2010 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 135 (1):31.

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