Conceptual fragmentation and the rise of eliminativism


Authors
Peter Vickers
Durham University
Henry Taylor
University of Birmingham
Abstract
Pluralist and eliminativist positions have proliferated within both science and philosophy of science in recent decades. This paper asks the question why this shift of thinking has occurred, and where it is leading us. We provide an explanation which, if correct, entails that we should expect pluralism and eliminativism to transform other debates currently unaffected, and for good reasons. We then consider the question under what circumstances eliminativism will be appropriate, arguing that it depends not only on the term in question, but also on the context of discussion and details of the debate at hand. The resultant selective eliminativism is an appealing compromise for various ‘pluralists’ and ‘eliminativists’ who are currently locking horns.
Keywords Eliminativism  Pluralism  Fragmentation  Concepts  Philosophy of science
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DOI 10.1007/s13194-016-0136-2
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References found in this work BETA

Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.Paul M. Churchland - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (February):67-90.
Doing Without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2009 - Oxford University Press.

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