Epistemic justification and psychological realism

Synthese 85 (2):199 - 230 (1990)
Abstract
The main thesis of this paper is that it is not possible to determine the nature of epistemic justification apart from scientific psychological investigation. I call this view the strong thesis of methodological psychologism. Two sub-theses provide the primary support for this claim. The first sub-thesis is that no account of epistemic justification is correct which requires for the possession of at least one justified belief a psychological capacity which humans do not have. That is, the correct account of epistemic justification must be psychologically realistic. The second sub-thesis is that it is not possible to determine whether an account of epistemic justification is psychologically realistic apart from scientific psychological investigation. After defending these subtheses, I point out some interesting consequences of the overall thesis which present a challenge to traditional epistemology.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00484792
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References found in this work BETA
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.W. V. Quine - 1969 - Columbia University Press.
Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Naturalistic Epistemology and Reliabilism.Alvin I. Goldman - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):301-320.
Scepticism and the Nature of Knowledge.James E. Taylor - 1993 - Philosophia 22 (1-2):3-27.
Naturalizing Goldman.Paul A. Roth - 1999 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):89-111.
The Value of Epistemology: A Defense.James E. Taylor - 1999 - Philosophical Papers 28 (3):169-185.

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