Philosophy Compass 2 (4):611–624 (2007)

Abstract
Philosophers continue to debate about David Hume’s case against the rationality of belief in miracles. This article clarifies semantic, epistemological, and metaphysical questions addressed in the controversy. It also explains the main premises of Hume’s argument and discusses criticisms of them. The article concludes that one’s evaluation of Hume’s argument will depend on one’s views about (a) the definitions of ’miracle’ and ’natural law’; (b) the type of reasoning one ought to employ to determine the probability that a particular miracle claim is true; and (c) whether reasonable people proportion their beliefs about the occurrence of miracles to their evidence
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DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00088.x
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References found in this work BETA

Warranted Christian Belief.Alvin Plantinga - 2000 - Oxford University Press USA.
Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.David Hume - 1955 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. Oxford University Press. pp. 112.
Warranted Christian Belief.Alvin Plantinga - 2000 - Philosophia Christi 3 (2):327-328.

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Citations of this work BETA

Miracles.Timothy McGrew - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Miracles.Michael Levine - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Miracles, Hinges, and Grammar in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty.Luigi Perissinotto - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):143-164.

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