Mind 89 (356):499-518 (1980)

Davidson poses the problem via three propositions p1-P3, Each persuasive but apparently inconsistent. His solution, That the three are consistent, Merely re-Phrases the problem. We should rather reject p2; if an agent judges that it would be better to do "x" than to do "y", Then he wants to do "x" more than he wants to do "y". Plato accepts p2 because he thinks all agents predominantly self-Interested, And hare because he thinks that evaluative judgments imply desires; both are criticized. An alternative to p2, Consistent with p1 and p3, Makes a subtler connection between judgment, Desire and behaviour
Keywords Plato   Hare, R. M   Davidson, Donald
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DOI 10.1093/mind/LXXXIX.356.499
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