Reference and the Rational Mind

CSLI Publications (2003)
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Referentialism has underappreciated consequences for our understanding of the ways in which mind, language, and world relate to one another. In exploring these consequences, this book defends a version of referentialism about names, demonstratives, and indexicals, in a manner appropriate for scholars and students in philosophy or the cognitive sciences. To demonstrate his view, Kenneth A. Taylor offers original and provocative accounts of a wide variety of semantic, pragmatic, and psychological phenomena, such as empty names, propositional attitude contexts, the nature of concepts, and the ultimate source and nature of normativity



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Author's Profile

Kenneth Taylor
PhD: University of Chicago; Last affiliation: Stanford University

Citations of this work

Mental Files.François Recanati - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Mental filing.Rachel Goodman & Aidan Gray - 2022 - Noûs 56 (1):204-226.
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The Mental Files Theory of Singular Thought: A Psychological Perspective.Michael Murez, Joulia Smortchkova & Brent Strickland - 2020 - In Rachel Goodman, James Genone & Nick Kroll (eds.), Singular Thought and Mental Files. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 107-142.
Propositional attitude reports.Thomas McKay - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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