In Reference and the Rational Mind. CSLI Publications (2003)

Kenneth Taylor
Stanford University
This essay defends three interlocking claims about singular beliefs and their ascriptions. The first is a claim about the nature of such beliefs; the second is a claim about the semantic contents of ascriptions of such beliefs; the third is a claim about the pragmatic significance of such ascriptions. With respect to the nature of singular belief, I claim that the contents of our singular beliefs are a joint product of mind and world, with neither mind nor world enjoying any peculiar priority over the other in the constitution of content. This view amounts to a rejection of the priority of so-called narrow or notional content over wide or referential content for singular beliefs. About the semantics of ascriptions of singular belief, I claim that such ascriptions ascribe what I call predicative doxastic commitments and nothing more. In particular, I will argue that to ascribe a predicative commitment is merely to say what property is being predicated by she who undertakes the relevant commitment to what object. My view has the consequence that ascriptions of singular beliefs typically do not either semantically specify or pragmatically implicate the modes of presentations, notions, or conceptions via which the ascribee cognizes the objects and properties relative to which she undertakes predicative commitments. To be sure, many maintain that at least one class of belief ascriptions -- so called de dicto ascriptions
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,261
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Modelling Collective Belief.Margaret Gilbert - 1987 - Synthese 73 (1):185-204.
A Simple Solution to the Problem of De Se Belief Ascriptions.Ari Maunu - 2000 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 33 (3-4):199-226.
Desire and Self-Knowledge.Jordi Fernández - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):517 – 536.
Which Immunity to Error?Joel Smith - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):273-83.
Believing in Language.Susan Dwyer & Paul M. Pietroski - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (3):338-373.
Semantic Norms and Temporal Externalism.Henry Jackman - 1996 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh


Added to PP index

Total views
122 ( #88,984 of 2,455,870 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #449,201 of 2,455,870 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes