Craig Taylor
Flinders University
Peter Winch's famous argument in "The Universalizability of Moral Judgments" that moral judgments are not always universalizable is widely thought to involve an essentially sceptical claim about the limitations of moral theories and moral theorising more generally. In this paper I argue that responses to Winch have generally missed the central positive idea upon which Winch's argument is founded: that what is right for a particular agent to do in a given situation may depend on what is and is not morally possible for them. I then defend the existence of certain genuine moral necessities and impossibilities in order to show how certain first-person moral judgements may be essentially personal.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2010
DOI 10.1080/00201740600576910
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 68,916
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Needs, Values, Truth.David Wiggins - 1990 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 180 (1):106-106.
Ethics and Action.Peter Winch - 1972 - London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
The Universalizability of Moral Judgements.Peter Winch - 1965 - The Monist 49 (2):196-214.
Trying to Make Sense.Peter Winch - 1991 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 29 (3):190-192.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
54 ( #207,931 of 2,497,778 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #428,370 of 2,497,778 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes