Epistemic Analyticity Reconsidered

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (2):280-292 (2022)
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It is nowadays standard to distinguish between epistemic and metaphysical analyticity. Metaphysical analyticity has been widely rejected, while epistemic analyticity has been widely endorsed. I argue that we also have good reason to reject epistemic analyticity. I do so by considering all the plausible ways of characterizing epistemic analyticity and of drawing the epistemic analytic–synthetic distinction. I argue that on all of them, the distinction fails to carve at the semantic joints. I conclude that there is good reason to think that there is no semantic distinction to be drawn between analytic and synthetic sentences.



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Célia Teixeira
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro

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References found in this work

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Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. V. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20-43.

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