Journal of Philosophy 116 (7):353-389 (2019)

Authors
Trevor Teitel
University of Toronto, St. George Campus
Abstract
The hole argument purports to show that all spacetime theories of a certain form are indeterministic, including the General Theory of Relativity. The argument has given rise to an industry of searching for a metaphysics of spacetime that delivers the right modal implications to rescue determinism. In this paper, I first argue that certain prominent extant replies to the hole argument—namely, those that appeal to an essentialist doctrine about spacetime—fail to deliver the requisite modal implications. As part of my argument, I show that threats to determinism of the sort brought out by the hole argument are more general than has heretofore been recognized. I then use these results to propose a novel essentialist doctrine about spacetime that successfully rescues determinism, what I call sufficiency metric essentialism. However, I go on to argue that once we realize what an essentialist doctrine about spacetime must look like in order to address the hole argument, we should reject all such doctrines, because they can't fulfill their ambition of improving on standard modal replies to the argument. I close by suggesting some lessons for future work on spacetime and the metaphysics of physics more broadly, and also drawing some general morals for contemporary metaphysics, in particular about (i) whether essence can be used to articulate a precise structuralist doctrine, and (ii) the relationship between essence and modality.
Keywords Spacetime  The Hole Argument  Haecceitism  Metric Essentialism  Essence  Modality  Structuralism  Substantivalism  Determinism  Diffeomorphism Invariance
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ISBN(s) 0022-362X
DOI 10.5840/jphil2019116723
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References found in this work BETA

Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Modal Logic as Metaphysics.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
No Work for a Theory of Grounding.Jessica M. Wilson - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):535-579.
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The World Just Is the Way It Is.David Builes - 2021 - The Monist 104 (1):1-27.

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