How not to reject the a priori

Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 59 (140):365-384 (2018)

Célia Teixeira
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro
According to one influential argument against the existence of a priori knowledge, there is no a priori knowledge because (i) no belief is immune to revision, and (ii) if there were a priori knowledge, at least some beliefs would be unrevisable. The aim of this paper is to examine and reject this argument against the a priori. It is given special attention to premise (ii) of the argument. Philip Kitcher has famously defended a version of this premise. His arguments are assessed and rejected. The conclusion is that we have no good reason to accept (ii), and, with it, the above argument against the a priori. The paper ends by proposing an account of the a priori that is perfectly compatible with (i).
Keywords a priori  unrevisable
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1590/0100-512x2018n14002ct
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 39,951
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Two Notions of Necessity.Martin Davies & Lloyd Humberstone - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (1):1-31.
The Incoherence of Empiricism.George Bealer - 1992 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66 (1):99-138.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. V. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Carnap and Logical Truth.W. V. Quine - 1960 - Synthese 12 (4):350--74.

View all 20 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

A Priori Justification.Albert Casullo - 2003 - Oxford University Press USA.
Infallible A Priori Self-Justifying Propositions.Glen Hoffmann - 2012 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):55-68.
How to Be a (Sort of) A Priori Physicalist.D. Gene Witmer - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):185-225.
A Priori Knowledge and Naturalized Epistemology.Teresa Anne Britton - 1997 - Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
Understanding the Revisability Thesis.Célia Teixeira - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (2):180-195.
The a Priori in Philosophy.Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.) - 2013 - Oxford University Press UK.
An Inferentialist Conception of the A Priori.Ralph Wedgwood - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:295–314.
Contingent A Priori Knowledge.John Turri - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):327-344.
The a Priori.George Bealer - 1999 - In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 2004.
The Unavailability of What We Mean.Georges Rey - 1993 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 46:61-101.


Added to PP index

Total views
11 ( #641,418 of 2,235,641 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #455,429 of 2,235,641 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature