Philosophia 47 (3):901-916 (2019)

Authors
Célia Teixeira
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract
According to the most popular account of the a priori, which we might call Analytic Account of the A Priori, we can explain the a priori in terms of the notion of analyticity. According to the least popular account of the a priori, the explanation of the a priori proceeds by appealing to the faculties used in the acquisition of a priori knowledge, such as the faculty of rational intuition – call this Rationalist Account of the A Priori. The main aim of this paper is to challenge the analytic account of the a priori to motivate a return to rationalism. To achieve this aim, I discuss and challenge two very different analytic accounts of the a priori: a concept-based account that relies on meaning-justification links, and an understanding-based account that does not rely on such links. I argue that the former is both extensionally inadequate and explanatorily deficient, and the latter can be made to work but only by employing such a rich notion of understanding that renders it a form of rationalism in disguise. I conclude by motivating a rationalist faculty-based account of the a priori.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11406-018-9998-1
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 61,008
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

View all 34 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

An Inferentialist Conception of the A Priori.Ralph Wedgwood - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:295–314.
Meaning Rationalism, a Priori, and Transparency of Content.Tadeusz Szubka - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (4):491-503.
The a Priori.George Bealer - 1999 - In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 2004.
The Definition of a Priori Knowledge.Eugene Orin Mills - 1990 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
A Priori Knowledge and Infallibility.Ivette Fred - 1997 - Dissertation, City University of New York
Towards a Default and Challenge Model of A Priori Warrant.Mikael Janvid - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 37:135-154.
Two Kinds of a Priori Infallibility.Glen Hoffmann - 2011 - Synthese 181 (2):241-253.
Presupposition and the a Priori.Nate Charlow - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):509-526.
A Priori.Edwin Mares - 2011 - Routledge.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-07-10

Total views
39 ( #269,760 of 2,439,433 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #282,588 of 2,439,433 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes