Rational Choice Theory and Backward-Looking Motives

In Peter Rona & Laszlo Zsolnai (eds.), Economic Objects and the Objects of Economics. Springer Verlag. pp. 117-123 (2018)
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Abstract

The paper argues that the philosophical underpinnings of rational choice theory are vitiated by consideration of the phenomenon of backward-looking motives, such as gratitude, fidelity, and many forms of honesty. Attempts to describe the actions and decisions of those acting from such motives in the terms of rational choice theory fail, and the model of human conduct which is implicit in the theory is both inadequate in itself and pernicious in its general influence. A picture may emerge of the human person as a repository of atomistic ‘experiences’, inhabiting a present from the vantage-point of which his relations to past and future ‘selves’ are contingent, and his responsibilities and commitments correspondingly fluid. And in economics, a supposedly ‘neutral’ account of rational choice in fact encourages and sustains a simple-minded utilitarian ethic.

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Roger Teichmann
Oxford University

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Instrumental Rationality in the Social Sciences.Katharina Nieswandt - 2023 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences (1):46-68.

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