Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (2):180-195 (2018)

Authors
Célia Teixeira
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract
W. V. Quine famously claimed that no statement is immune to revision. This thesis has had a profound impact on twentieth century philosophy, and it still occupies centre stage in many contemporary debates. However, despite its importance it is not clear how it should be interpreted. I show that the thesis is in fact ambiguous between three substantially different theses. I illustrate the importance of clarifying it by assessing its use in the debate against the existence of a priori knowledge. I show how the three different readings of the thesis can be used to generate three substantially different and philosophically significant arguments against the a priori. I further challenge each one of these arguments against the a priori.
Keywords a priori   defeaters   overriding   undermining  revisability thesis
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Reprint years 2018
DOI 10.1163/18756735-000030
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References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1981 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.

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Citations of this work BETA

How Not to Reject the a Priori.Célia Teixeira - 2018 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 59 (140):365-384.

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