Philosophy of Science 71 (4):425-447 (2004)

This essay endorses the conclusion of Sklar’s “Dappled Theories in a Uniform World” that he announces in his abstract, that notwithstanding recent attacks foundational theories are universal in their scope. But Sklar’s rejection of a “pluralist ontology” is questioned. It is concluded that so called “foundational” and “phenomenological” theories are on a much more equal footing as sources of knowledge than Sklar would allow, that “giving an ontology” generally involves dealing in idealizations, and that a transfigured “ficitonalism” provides an (in many respects) better model of scientific knowledge than the model of “foundational truths.”.
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DOI 10.1086/423625
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The Unity of Science.Jordi Cat - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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