Modeling Truth


Many in philosophy understand truth in terms of precise semantic values, true propositions. Following Braun and Sider, I say that in this sense almost nothing we say is, literally, true. I take the stand that this account of truth nonetheless constitutes a vitally useful idealization in understanding many features of the structure of language. The Fregean problem discussed by Braun and Sider concerns issues about application of language to the world. In understanding these issues I propose an alternative modeling tool summarized in the idea that inaccuracy of statements can be accommodated by their imprecision. This yields a pragmatist account of truth, but one not subject to the usual counterexamples. The account can also be viewed as an elaborated error theory. The paper addresses some prima facie objections and concludes with implications for how we address certain problems in philosophy.



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Citations of this work

Measurement Accuracy Realism.Paul Teller - 2018 - In The Experimental Side of Modeling,. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. pp. 273-298.
Referential and Perspectival Realism.Paul Teller - 2018 - Spontaneous Generations 9 (1):151-164.
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The Concept of Law.Hla Hart - 1961 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK.
Scientific perspectivism.Ronald N. Giere - 2006 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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