Anti-realist aporias

Mind 109 (436):825--854 (2000)
Abstract
Using a quantified propositional logic involving the operators it is known that and it is possible to know that, we formalize various interesting philosophical claims involved in the realism debate. We set out inferential rules for the epistemic modalities, ranging from ones that are obviously analytic, to ones that are epistemologically more substantive or even controversial. Then we investigate various aporias for the realism debate. These are constructively inconsistent triads of claims from our list: a claim expressing some sort of common ground in the debate; a characteristically anti-realist thesis about truth and knowability; and a characteristically realist thesis about determinacy of truth value. Various patterns of reductio proof for these inconsistent triads are generated, so as to display their variety. The reductio proofs use only the inferential rules set out earlier. The philosophical utility of each aporia for the anti-realist is then assessed. This involves consideration of the acceptability of the premiss expressing common ground; the strength and plausibility of the anti-realist premiss; the strength of the realist premiss that is the ultimate target of the reductio; and the analytic status of the inferential rules applied within the proof.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/mind/109.436.825
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,810
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Fitch Back in Action Again?S. Rosenkranz - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):67-71.
Luminosity and Determinacy.Elia Zardini - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):765-786.
Knowability and the Capacity to Know.Michael Fara - 2010 - Synthese 173 (1):53 - 73.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
34 ( #156,738 of 2,202,780 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #301,722 of 2,202,780 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature