A Metacognitive Account of Phenomenal Force

Mind and Language 38 (4):1081-1101 (2023)
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According to phenomenal conservatism or dogmatism, perceptual experiences can give us immediate justification for beliefs about the external world in virtue of having a distinctive kind of phenomenal character—namely phenomenal force. I present three cases to show that phenomenal force is neither pervasive among nor exclusive to perceptual experiences. The plausibility of such cases calls out for explanation. I argue that contrary to a long-held assumption, phenomenal force is a separate, non-perceptual state generated by some metacognitive mechanisms that monitor one’s first-order mental processes and states. This new account advances our understanding of the nature of phenomenal force.

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Lu Teng
New York University, Shanghai

Citations of this work

The Epistemic Insignificance of Phenomenal Force.Lu Teng - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
The Justificatory Power of Memory Experience.Lu Teng - 2024 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5.
Sympathetic Magic: A Psychological Enquiry.Frederic Peters - 2023 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 23 (5):522-570.

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References found in this work

Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Consciousness and Mind.David M. Rosenthal - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.

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