Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3):547-563 (2021)

Lu Teng
New York University, Shanghai
ABSTRACT Cognitive penetrability refers to the possibility that perceptual experiences are influenced by our beliefs, expectations, emotions, or other personal-level mental states. In this paper, I focus on the epistemological implication of cognitive penetration, and examine how, exactly, aetiologies matter to the justificatory power of perceptual experiences. I examine a prominent theory, according to which some cognitively penetrated perceptual experiences are like conclusions of bad inferences. Whereas one version of this theory is psychologically implausible, the other version has sceptical consequences. In the second half of the paper, I suggest an alternative theory, drawing on recent empirical research on imagining-perception interaction and the epistemology of imagining.
Keywords Cognitive penetration  Perception  Perceptual inference  Sensory imagining  Justification  Epistemology
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00048402.2020.1812095
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,703
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Epistemic Role of Consciousness.Declan Smithies - 2019 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
The Language of Thought.J. A. Fodor - 1978 - Critica 10 (28):140-143.
The Rationality of Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
The Varieties of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - Oxford University Press.

View all 31 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
60 ( #182,339 of 2,462,584 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
14 ( #53,380 of 2,462,584 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes