Deflationism and the Godel Phenomena: Reply to Cieslinski

Mind 119 (474):437-450 (2010)
I clarify how the requirement of conservative extension features in the thinking of various deflationists, and how this relates to another litmus claim, that the truth-predicate stands for a real, substantial property. I discuss how the deflationist can accommodate the result, to which Cieslinski draws attention, that non-conservativeness attends even the generalization that all logical theorems in the language of arithmetic are true. Finally I provide a four-fold categorization of various forms of deflationism, by reference to the two claims of conservativeness and substantiality. This helps to clarify the various possible positions in the deflationism debate
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzq035
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References found in this work BETA
Deflating the Conservativeness Argument.Hartry Field - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (10):533-540.
Transfinite Recursive Progressions of Axiomatic Theories.Solomon Feferman - 1962 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 27 (3):259-316.
Deflationism and the Godel Phenomena.N. Tennant - 2002 - Mind 111 (443):551-582.

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Challenges to Deflationary Theories of Truth.Bradley Armour-Garb - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (4):256-266.

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