Mind 111 (443):551-582 (2002)

Neil Tennant
Ohio State University
Any consistent and sufficiently strong system of first-order formal arithmetic fails to decide some independent Gödel sentence. We examine consistent first-order extensions of such systems. Our purpose is to discover what is minimally required by way of such extension in order to be able to prove the Gödel sentence in a non-trivial fashion. The extended methods of formal proof must capture the essentials of the so-called 'semantical argument' for the truth of the Gödel sentence. We are concerned to show that the deflationist has at his disposal such extended methods-methods which make no use or mention of a truth-predicate. This consideration leads us to reassess arguments recently advanced-one by Shapiro and another by Ketland-against the deflationist's account of truth. Their main point of agreement is this: they both adduce the Gödel phenomena as motivating a 'thick' notion of truth, rather than the deflationist's 'thin' notion. But the so-called 'semantical argument', which appears to involve a 'thick' notion of truth, does not really have to be semantical at all. It is, rather, a reflective argument. And the reflections upon a system that are contained therein are deflationarily licit, expressible without explicit use or mention of a truth-predicate. Thus it would appear that this anti-deflationist objection fails to establish that there has to be more to truth than mere conformity to the disquotational T-schema.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/111.443.551
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Truth is Simple.Leon Horsten & Graham E. Leigh - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):195-232.
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