Philosophical Explorations 22 (2):163-176 (2019)

Authors
Sergio Tenenbaum
University of Toronto, Mississauga
Abstract
Constitutivists have tried to answer Enoch’s “schmagency” objection by arguing that Enoch fails to appreciate the inescapability of agency. Although these arguments are effective against some versions of the objection, I argue that they leave constitutivism vulnerable to an important worry; namely, that constitutivism leaves us alienated from the moral norms that it claims we must follow. In the first part of the paper, I try to make this vague concern more precise: in a nutshell, it seems that constitutivism cannot provide an adequate account of the relation between the constitutive norms of agency and the particular ends the agent pursues. I then provide a broad outline of an interpretation of Kant’s formalism that is immune to this objection. I conclude that constitutivism is best understood as the upshot of a formalist view of categorical practical principles.
Keywords Constitutivism  Kant  Practical Reason
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DOI 10.1080/13869795.2019.1599053
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References found in this work BETA

Being Realistic About Reasons.T. M. Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.
Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Practical Philosophy.Immanuel Kant - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Constructivism in Metaethics.Carla Bagnoli - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Two Sorts of Constitutivism.Jeremy David Fix - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (1):1-20.
Constructivism in Metaethics.Carla Bagnoli - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Transcendental Philosophy As Capacities‐First Philosophy.Karl Schafer - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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